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I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

There is little, if any, disagreement between the parties regarding the facts of this
case. The essential facts are that an Order for Entry of Default against George Hansen
was entered on September 12, 1993. (R. Vol. I, p.28) This case concluded on September
15, 2000, with a Special Jury Verdict entered against Plaintif£'Appellee Meyers and a
final Judgment and Order entered on that date. (R. Vol. I, p. 11) A final Judgment,
Order and Decree was entered on December 4, 2000, "dismissing the complaint with
prejudice." (R. Vol. I, pp. 48-49) The dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice was
never amended so as to give notice that the dismissal was limited only to Jack and
Kathleen Lott. On September 25, 2001, Meyers filed an ex parte application for default
judgment against Hansen pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) I.R.C.P. (R. Vol. I, p. 50) Said ex
parte application for default judgment did not contain any written certification of any

address for George Hansen or any three day notice of application to Hansen as required
under Rule 55(b)(2). (R. Vol. I, pp. 50, 89-90) There is no record of any service of the
application or of the default judgment on George Hansen (R. Vol. I, pp 89-90), which is
in accord with the Affidavit of George Hansen that he never received notice of, or a copy
of, the default judgment. (R. Vol. I, pp 92-93) On May 16, 2006, Meyers renewed said
Default Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 57) On September 12, 2006, Hansen was served with an
Order for Examination of Debtor. (R. Vol. I, p.57)
With the case having been concluded in December of 2000, Hansen claims he did
- -' ,,~,1Prstond

that he was being subjected to a default judgment tmtil he obtained legal

final judgment in the case on December 4, 2000, until Mr. Hansen was served for an
Order of Debtor's Examination on September 12, 2006, is approximately three months
short of six years. The question arises, how long can a party wait to give notice to a
defendant of a default judgment? The legal ramifications of this time-period fact is
especially important when dealing with default judgments, since they are not favored at
law. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). The procedural due
process ramifications of this time-period fact are brought into focus by the notice
requirements governing applications for default judgment under Rule 55(b )(2).

In

assessing the fact situations surrounding an application for default, the timing of the
application and adherence of the notice requirements go hand in hand. Surely application
for default judgment more than five years after the end of a case would be void as a
matter of law since it would exceed even the five year limitation on renewal of
judgments.

LC. § 10-1111

As it was, Meyers waited almost a year after the case

concluded to apply for a default judgment. Hansen contends, however, that the date of
application (whether it is one year or three years after conclusion of the action) is not the
legally significant fact here; rather, the legally significant fact is that notice of the default
judgment was not given to Hansen until almost six years after the conclusion of the
litigation and dismissal of the case.

II.
ARGUMENT
1. Th.e Default Judgment is Void as a Matter of Law.

The applicable legal standards under Rule 55(c) I.R.C.P. are set forth in Rule
60(b), I.R.C.P. which allows a default judgment to be set aside where it is void. (Rule
60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(5)). When a trial court's ruling under Rule 60(b) turns largely on
findings of fact, such factual determinations by the trial court are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard and will be generally upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. Suitts v. Nix, supra at 708, P.3d at 122; Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104
Idaho 321, 658 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1983). This case did not tum on findings of fact by
the district court for the reason that the salient facts were not in dispute.

Hansen

respectfully contends that the district court erred in perceiving the legal due process issue
as discretionary and not as a matter of law. There is no dispute in this case regarding the
legally significant fact situation that almost six years elapsed between the final judgment
of this case and notification to Mr. Hansen that a default judgment had been entered
against him. The notice/due process issue here is clearly a question of law. Due process
issues are generally questions of law, and this Court exercises free review over questions
of law.

Spenser v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 180 P. 3d 487 (2008); Idaho

Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City Council of City of Boise, 134 Idaho 651, 654, 8 P.3d
646, 649 (2000).
Here, the failure of notice and the resulting breach of Mr. Hansen's due process
rights rise directly from Meyers' failure to comply with the requirements of Rule
•
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o_ 1 n the factors constituting breach of

procedural due process are present in this case. lvfathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) cited in Gay v. County Comm 1rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 628-29,
651 P.2d 560, 562-63 (Ct. App. 1982). When considering default judgments, procedural
due process requires "meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard" in the
action under all circumstances of the case. .McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100
P.3d 621, 623 (2004).
Meyers' claim that Hansen was provided with meaningful notice of the default
judgment by the fact that he was served \Jl>ith the Complaint and later v,ith the Notice of
Default is simply inaccurate. Service of a complaint and a notice of default on a party do
not constitute notice of entry of a judgment against that party. Meyers' argument in this
regard is inapposite. Obviously, many events can transpire in a case between the filing of
a complaint or the taking of a default that serve to resolve the case before any judgment is
entered. Clearly Hansen's failure to respond to the Complaint or the Notice of Default
place him in a position to have waived certain defenses in the event a judgment was ever
entered. However, for a defendant to ever be able to exercise his procedural due process
rights under Rule 60(b) I.R.C.P., he must have timely notice of entry of a judgment - in
this case a default judgment.
Meyers claims that the omission of Hansen's address in Meyers' 2001
Application for Default Judgment is not a procedural error that amounts to a due process
violation. Meyers' failure in this regard resulted in Hansen not receiving notice of the
entry of the default judgment against him. Ensming that proper notice is provided is the
very reason for Rule 55(b)(2). "Notice" is the keystone of notice pleadings and is the
r ......... J/"
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111 Idaho 1027, 729 P.2d

1090 (Ct. App. 1986) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.") Id Idaho at 1095, P.2d at 1032. See also
Hartman v United Heritage Property and Cas. Co., 141, Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340,
344 (2005); Wright v Wright, 130 Idaho 198, 950 P.2d 1257 (1998). This failure of
notice and the resulting breach of Mr. Hansen's rights of procedural due process are the
direct, logical consequence of Meyers' failure to certify the address as required. (R. Vol.

I, pp. 89-90)
Meyers claims that the provisions of Rule 55(b)(2) are analogous to those of
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239(a). (Respondent's Brief, p. 9) This comparison fails
on its face, because the Texas rule expressly states that "failure to comply with the
provisions of this rule shall not affect the finality of the judgment." Hence, a party
cannot rely on such notice as prescribed in that rule. To the contrary the notice by
certification prescribed in Rule 55(b)(2) I.R.C.P. "must" be made in any application for
default judgment.
Turning to the issue of denial of due process as a result of cumulative effects of
irregularities and/or delay, Meyers misconstrues the applicability of Bass v. Hoagland,
172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir, 1949) to this case. Whereas Hansen contends that the five year
nine month delay of default judgment in this case is in itself sufficient grounds to void the
Judgment on procedural due process ground. The additional cumulative effect of delay in
this case further exacerbates the egregiousness of the due process violation. Default
~
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Mevers delayed eight years

before applying and obtaining a default judgment; and, even then, almost a year after the
conclusion of the case. It is the cumulative effect of this delay and lack of notice which
finds resonance in the Bass decision. A party cannot exercise its procedural due process
rights under Rule 60(b) without notice of the entry of a judgment. The cumulative delay
in this case from the entry of default to the notice of entry of default judgment is a period
of exactly 13 years - from September 12, 1993 to September 12, 2006. As appointed out
in Appellant's Brief, such a period of time is an egregious erosion of any ability on behalf
of a party to exercise its procedural due process under Rule 60(b). Meyers concedes
Hansen's argument that a judgment void on due process grounds is not subject to
challenge on grounds of timeliness on the Motion to Set the Judgment Aside.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 11, n. 1)

2.

Hansen is Entitled to Relief Under Rule 60(b)(S) on the Grounds That the

Default Judgment Should not Have Prospective Application.
Meyers argues that Hansen failed to bring a timely Motion to Set Aside the
Default Judgment for purposes of Rule 60(b)(S) I.R.C.P. Hansen acknowledges that,
unlike a motion to set aside a void judgment under Rule 60(b)( 4) a motion under Rule
60(b)(S) must be brought within a reasonable time. Meyers argues that the issue of
reasonable time is a question of fact to be resolved in the discretion of the trial court and
not to be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16) The trial court
found that the 16 1/2 month time period from September 20, 2006 when Hansen filed his
first request to be excused from the debtor's exam, until February 11, 2008, when Hansen
-"' -·- - - ,-1,,~
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ITTounds not to be reasonably

timely under the provision of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). (R. Vol. II, p. 207) However Hansen
contends that the trial court's findings regarding a "reasonable time" in this instance are
clearly erroneous for the reason that the court utilized the wrong time standards. The
court simply based its decision on the time between when Hansen first clearly became
aware of the judgment and when he challenged it. With respect to a challenge of a
default judgment under Rule 60(b)(5), the reasonable time requirement requires a
showing that the judgment is prospective and it is no longer equitable to enforce the
judgment as written. Devine v. Chiff, lllidaho 476, 478-79, 725 P.2d 181, 183-184
(1986); Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983).

Under this formula,

"reasonable time" must be calculated from the time the judgment becomes "prospective"
and no longer equitable to enforce it - not from the time the defendant becomes aware of
the judgment. Hence, the time begins to run "when subsequent events make it no longer
equitable that the judgment has prospective application."

MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE, § 60.26[4], p. 337, cited in Appellant's B1ief, p. 28. The period of post
judgment depositions and discovery from September 2007 (R. Vol. I, p.13) to April 2008
(R. Vol. I, p. 16), established that Hansen is without substantial assets and that his only

source of income is his pension and social security.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 1) The

establishment of these facts constitutes a showing that it is no longer equitable to enforce
the judgment against him since his social security payments and his pension are immune
from attachment. By this calculation, the due process challenge of the default judgment
would be timely.

III.
CONCLUSION
On the undisputed facts of this case, the issue of whether the failure of notice of
entry of a default judgment for a pe1iod exceeding five years constitutes a breach of
procedural due process sufficient to void said judgment is clearly a matter of law, The
district court erred in perceiving this issue as discretionary. Appellant submits that the
subject failure of notice serves to render this default judgment void for the reason that
notice is the heart of notice pleadings and the constitutional concept of due process and is
particularly applicable to "unfavored" default judgments, The delay of 13 years between
entry of default and the notice to Appellant of the entry of default judgment only serves
to make the lack of notice more egregious. Finally, the judgment is prospective and it
would be no longer equitable to enforce the judgment in light of Hansen's circumstances,
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the default
judgment set aside as void,

Respectfully Submitted this l 9th day of March 2009,

RUl"ITI & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:~~iif
JO
L. RlJNF'r
tomey for Appellant
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